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Abstract 
This study explores changing epistemic beliefs in the 
history domain among 18 prospective history teachers. 
Drawing data from these college undergraduate history 
majors who were considering teaching careers, the study 
traces out an exploration of how epistemic beliefs may 
change at this crucial developmental point. A likert-scale 
instrument served as a primary data-gathering tool and it 
was administered in a pre-post, design.  Observational and 
interview data augmented the scale data.  A university-
based course served as an educational vehicle designed to 
influence epistemic beliefs.  The results among the 
prospective teachers were mixed.  Some students’ 
epistemic beliefs remained unaffected by the course, while 
others changed, some quite dramatically.  Reasons for 
varied influences are the subject of the discussion.  
Implications of the results are also considered. 
 
Keywords: Epistemic Knowledge; Historical Thinking; 
History Teaching; Prospective Teachers. 
 
 
Bruce VanSledright 
Ph D. and Professor. Coordinator of Ph.D. 
Strand in Elementary Education.  
University of North Carolina 
bvansled@uncc.edu 
 
Kimberly Reddy 
PhD in Curriculum and Instruction. She 
has extensive experience with empirical and 
qualitative research and is trained in writing 
various forms of associated reports and 
scholarly articles.The Key School. 
kimberly.m.reddy@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cite this article:  
VANSLEDRIGHT, Bruce; REDDY, Kimberly. Changing Epistemic Beliefs? An Exploratory Study of 
Cognition Among Prospective History Teachers. Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 6, 
n.11, p. 28-68, jan./abr. 2014.  
 
DOI: 10.5965/2175180306112014028 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5965/2175180306112014028 
Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 6, n. 11, p. 28-68, jan./abr. 2014.   p.28 
 
  
 
 
Changing Epistemic Beliefs? An Exploratory Study of Cognition Among Prospective History Teachers 
Bruce VanSledright – Kimberly Reddy 
T
em
po  &  A
rgum
ento 
 
 
 
Crenças epistêmicas em 
mudança? Um estudo 
investigativo do conhecimento 
entre futuros professores de 
história 
 
Resumo 
Este estudo investiga crenças epistêmicas em 
mudança na área de história entre 18 futuros 
professores de história. Colhendo dados desses 
estudantes de graduação em história que estavam 
considerando seguir a carreira docente, o estudo 
procede a uma investigação sobre como as crenças 
epistêmicas podem mudar neste momento crucial de 
desenvolvimento. O instrumento de escala Likert 
serviu como ferramenta para reunir dados primários e 
foi aplicado em um estágio antes e depois do curso. 
Dados de observação e de entrevista aumentaram os 
dados da escala. Um curso sediado em uma 
universidade serviu como veículo educacional com o 
objetivo de influenciar as crenças epistêmicas. Os 
resultados entre os futuros professores foram mistos. 
Algumas crenças epistêmicas dos alunos não se 
alteraram, enquanto outras mudaram, e algumas 
fortemente. As razões para as influências variadas 
são o tema da discussão. E as implicações dos 
resultados também serão considerados. 
 
Palavras-chave: Conhecimento epistêmico; 
Pensamento histórico; Ensino de história; Futuros 
Professores. 
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Introduction 
 Danielle, a seasoned American history teacher, in responding to a question that 
asked her to discuss what she considered history to be and the roles facts and 
interpretations played in the work of constructing histories, responded this way: 
For me, history is never just the facts, because you really don’t know 
what occurred unless you go in and research it, and then you know for 
sure what happened during the time period.  So, you can gather 
information about a particular historical event up to a certain point, but 
depending on the documents you pick or the people that you talk to, 
there will always be bias I guess…. 
 
In trying to understand her beliefs about history through comments such as these, we 
need to look closely at what she says.  First, she appears to believe that the past leaves 
for us some brute facts to consider.  Yet, in order to make sense of them, some additional 
digging is necessary.  That digging implicates the role of an investigator.  As such, history 
appears to emerge in an interaction between an interrogator (the knower) and the past 
and its residua (what is to be known, or the object of the knower’s attempt to know).  So 
far so good it would seem. 
 Then Danielle shifts to entertaining more about the inner workings of that 
interaction between the knower and the historical objects to be known.  Knowers can 
plumb the depths of the past, but only “to a certain point.”  At that point, bias takes over.  
With a bit of symbolic shoulder shrugging embedded in her final phrase, “I guess,” 
Danielle signals that she may not think the problem of bias is surmountable.  As her voice 
trails off, we are left wondering whether she, as historical investigator and potential 
knower, possesses any criteria for managing bias.  In the initial portions of her comment, 
she seems convinced that research can provide some “sure” historical knowledge.  But 
her trailing phrase appears to undo that confidence.  Bias appears to be all we are left 
with and we have little hope, perhaps, of dealing with it successfully as we try to get to 
the bottom of what “really happened” in the past. 
 Why is any of this important?  First, some people’s protestations to the contrary, 
serious historical study plunges knowers into a paradoxical position relative to what they 
wish to know about the past.  As Joan Wallach Scott (1996) once observed, no matter 
Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 6, n. 11, p. 28-68, jan./abr. 2014.   p.30 
 
  
 
 
Changing Epistemic Beliefs? An Exploratory Study of Cognition Among Prospective History Teachers 
Bruce VanSledright – Kimberly Reddy 
T
em
po  &  A
rgum
ento 
 
how much a knower may wish to tell the past as it really happened, to tell it true so to 
speak, such a move is denied, because we have yet to find the means to reconstruct the 
past and relive it in order to know its truth.  The past as it really happened is lost to us in 
the present.  All the knower has at her disposal are shards of and remnants and residue 
from the past that must be interpreted.  And as Danielle appears to lament, bias surfaces 
at every turn.  The remnants all contain it and, perhaps more importantly, so does the 
knower, who cannot help but interpret those them from her contemporaneous temporal 
anchors and the inescapable perspectives she maintains.  In the end, all historical 
investigators appear to have at their disposal, if their epistemic cognition is well honed, is 
what historian James Kloppenberg (1989, p. 1030) called a type of pragmatic 
hermeneutics that allows for nothing more than “…hypotheses, provisional syntheses, 
[and] imaginative but warranted interpretations”.  Danielle wants to know “for sure,” but 
she cannot.  What is she to do? 
 And second, this issue is of concern because Danielle is not the lone historical 
investigator, scurrying among the archives trying to ferret out the past’s truth for the 
next history she will author.  She’s a secondary American history teacher with over 100 
students to whom she is educationally responsible every day.  If she is epistemically, and 
by extension, cognitively stuck on this problem of bias, what will she teach her students 
about how to deal with it?  She had noted earlier in the interview about how important it 
is to teach her kids about the past using source materials that go beyond the textbook’s 
account.  She believes it is important to her charges’ knowing and to their task of 
becoming better knowers.  But in the process, she risks hanging them up on the same 
powerful, knower/knowing paradox, especially if the accounts and sources she gives 
them promote interpretive conflicts and are riddled with bias, something that is nearly if 
not wholly inevitable.  If she has not resolved this problem for herself, say, via a type of 
pragmatic hermeneutics—and there is no evidence from her comments that she has—
what will she teach her students once they encounter the issue?  Will her students come 
away from reading bias- and conflict-laden accounts with the idea that it’s all just bias all 
the way down, and therefore any story one might tell would be as good as any other 
story because it’s all just someone’s opinion anyway?  Of course, we cannot tell without 
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visiting Danielle’s classroom.  Her comments, though, are not particularly reassuring. 
 It has become increasingly attractive for history teachers to supplement course 
readings with sources other than the textbook (e.g., HICKS; DOOLITTLE; LEE, 2004).  Juicy 
primary accounts are especially coveted among history teachers because, they say, they 
increase interest and engagement.  Whereas textbooks perennially bore, firsthand 
accounts can better incite curiosity, beg questions, and otherwise stimulate attention.  
Such accounts have also proliferated on the Internet, making their accessibility only a 
matter of a few digital clicks.  Yet, what are the consequences for kids of this move 
toward expanding accounts?  How do teachers help them deal with the problem of 
perspective they encounter upon entering this world?  And what tools do teachers have 
in their own epistemic toolkits for dealing with this knower-knowing problem, tools they 
could share in their classrooms?  Where are they supposed to learn them?  You cannot 
teach what you do not know.  These questions served as the underpinning of the present 
study. 
 
Relevant Literature 
Over a decade since the beginning of the new millennium, we have studied history 
teachers such as Danielle in the context of Teaching American History grant projects in 
the USA.  Such projects were designed to reshape how they teach.  These projects 
endeavored to help teachers learn how to teach historical thinking practices to their 
students on the assumption that to understand the past more deeply, students need to 
upgrade their thinking practices.  In short, directors and professional developers on these 
projects attempted to take advantage of the burgeoning research in history education in 
an effort to shift teachers’ practices away from the ubiquitous PowerPoint presentations 
of repackaged textbook histories and more towards historical study as an investigative 
enterprise that depends on being able to think historically.  In order to teach historical 
thinking, the directors and developers reasonably surmised, teachers would need to 
know how to do it themselves.  Our role as independent evaluators on these projects 
taught us that learning to think historically was no mean feat.  We started to attune our 
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attention to data we were collecting from the teachers that began to show us that a 
number of the teachers held beliefs about the nature of historical knowledge, where it 
comes from, and how it’s warrented that seemed to block their progress.   
Effectively many were like Danielle.  They could fairly quickly come to idea that 
history was an interpretive enterprise that relied on a capacity to think and reason 
historically, to realize that making sense of perspective was crucial.  However, they would 
then become ensnared on what some of them would call the problem of bias.  That is, it 
seemed to them that it was inescapable bias—all the way down.  How could one arrive at 
a solid interpretation if bias and opinion crept in everywhere?  And as Danielle alludes, 
accounts from the past—the key venue from which interpretations could be drawn—
were all just people’s opinions and interpretations rooted in their own personal 
positionalities of the time.  Many would conclude that history was whatever the 
investigator wanted it to be.  Some histories were simply written better and some were 
more rhetorically persuasive, but not necessarily accounts that were closer to what 
actually happened.  These teachers would become, sometimes rather begrudgingly and 
often despairingly, abject relativists, stuck in a rather uncomfortable epistemic position 
that one could not warrant knowledge in history except to say that histories were little 
more than various investigators’ opinions, and we are all entitled to hold our own.  When 
we would visit their classrooms on occasion, we would observe them teaching 
(intentionally or otherwise, we could not always tell) such ideas to their students. 
We hypothesized that the teachers failed to explicitly learn what Kloppenberg 
(1989, p.1030) called a pragmatic hermeneutics, a process he says supplants “the noble 
dream of scientific objectivity” while also eschewing “the nightmare of complete 
relativism” .  Pragmatic hermeneutics, if Kloppenberg is to be believed, appears to be the 
way around the problem, at least in history.  But how does someone develop an 
epistemic position framed out by pragmatic hermeneutics?  We turned to the research 
literature to see if and how others had researched this issue, the problem of what to do 
when, in Kloppenberg's terms, the pursuit of objectivity becomes impossible and the 
alternative of complete relativism feels more like a frightening nihilism. 
Epistemic cognition can be understood as “as the cognitive process enabling 
Revista Tempo e Argumento, Florianópolis, v. 6, n. 11, p. 28-68, jan./abr. 2014.   p.33 
 
  
 
 
Changing Epistemic Beliefs? An Exploratory Study of Cognition Among Prospective History Teachers 
Bruce VanSledright – Kimberly Reddy 
T
em
po  &  A
rgum
ento 
 
individuals to consider the criteria, limits, and certainty of knowing” (MAGGIONI;  
VANSLEDRIGHT; ALEXANDER, 2009, p. 188).  An individual’s epistemic stance therefore 
defines what counts as knowledge and how that knowledge can be acquired and applied.  
These conceptions of knowledge, which shape an individual’s belief structures (HOFER, 
2002), powerfully impact one’s understanding of teaching and learning within a subject 
matter (HOFER, 2002; HOFER e and PINTRICH, 1997; LAMPERT, 1990; SCHOENFIELD, 
1983). Within the domain of history, these habits of thought are used to make sense of 
historical concepts, influence a person’s ability to work with historical texts, and affect 
the overall ways in which a he or she approaches the study of past. 
When considering the ways in which people think about history, it is important to 
acknowledge their epistemological understandings surrounding the nature of domain 
knowledge. Specifically, it is important to consider the relationships between the 
investigator—the knower, and the past—what’s to be known.  Such dimensions 
represent ways of knowing, which dictate how and what a learner constructs as 
knowledge.    
 Often, the literature indicates, novices approach sources in history as 
“decontextualized, disembodied authorless forms of neutral information that fall ready 
made out of the sky” (VANSLEDRIGHT, 2010, p.116). This epistemic stance is characterized 
by an understanding of history as a direct mirror of the past. The knower or the 
investigator is absent (MAGGIONI; VANSLEDRIGHT; REDDY, 2009).  These learners do not 
decipher between the past and historical accounts, as they believe them to be one in the 
same. Knowledge, as presented within historical accounts, is understood to be absolute 
(KUHN;  WEINSTOCK, 2002), or dualist—being either right or wrong (HOFER, 2001), and 
acquired through authoritative renderings (KING; KITCHENER, 2002).  Cognitive impasses 
occur when evidentiary conflicts surface, such as when historical documents present 
differing ideas about the same event. These impasses leave the investigator mentally 
paralyzed and able to do little more than ambiguously choose one account as the capital-
T-truth (frequently one officialized by authorities or one that sounds particularly 
authoritative; see PAXTON, 1999), while discounting the others as fictitious or inaccurate 
due to author bias or error.  
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 Other learners have quite the opposite epistemic understanding of historical 
knowledge. These learners view knowledge creation in history as the result of opinion.  
They “tend to borrow their story from accounts or pieces of accounts on the basis of 
instinctive preferences or casual selection” (MAGGIONI;  VANSLEDRIGHT; ALEXANDER, 
2009, p. 198).  Also known as “cut and paste” investigators, they have limited strategies 
to judge historical sources (LEE and ASHBY, 2000; VANSLEDRIGHT, 2011). They do 
acknowledge the active role of knower in the process of knowledge generation.  But a 
naïve understanding of author perspective and positionality often drive them to conclude 
that all historical accounts are equally biased and/or equally trustworthy or untrustworthy 
as the case may be (LEE; SHEMILT, 2003; MAGGIONI; VANSLEDRIGHT; REDDY, 2009). 
Therefore, these erstwhile knowers equate the known (aka, the past) with whatever 
accounts they can piece together.  However, they often quickly discover that cutting and 
pasting fails to solve for the problem of knowing and understanding.  More cognitive 
impasses ensue.  Lacking the epistemic understanding to reconcile these gaps (i.e., 
judgment criteria associated with the concept of reliability), these knowers often wind up 
frustrated and unable to move forward with the construction of historical understandings 
(LEE, 2004).  Danielle comes to mind here. 
 Finally, there is yet a third epistemic position often used to characterize the 
epistemological stances of learners who have developed more expert ways of knowing.  
These knowers believe that the construction of history is neither absolute nor relative.  
Rather they understand the importance of disciplinary heuristics in the development of 
authentic historical interpretations.  They view knowledge as actively constructed (KING; 
& KITCHENER, 2002) by the knower through the use of conjectural logic. It is always 
evolving and ways of knowing are coordinated with evidentiary judgment and 
justification (HOFER, 2001).  Generally speaking, they are able to reconcile the cognitive 
impasses often experienced by other types of knowers by acknowledging the 
positionality of evidence, using procedural understandings, which demand that evidence 
be carefully evaluated for consistency and reliability, and bridging gaps between accounts 
using logical sequencing of events or contexts.  This stance directly links and coordinates 
the role of the knower, or the historical investigator, with what is to be known (the past) 
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via the application of criteria and tools for making decisions.  These knowers appear to 
utilize a pragmatic hermeneutics (KLOPPENBERG, 1989). 
Both learners’ prior experiences and epistemic beliefs are essential to 
understanding how they negotiate the conceptualizations necessary to participate in 
historical thinking in ways that enhance their understandings.  To aide in the continued 
study of how historical cognition evolves, researchers have constructed progression 
models intended to better understand the development of epistemic stances in history 
(e.g., LEE and ASHBY, 2000; LEE and SHEMILT, 2003). Due to the hierarchical presentation 
of progression models, they sometimes carry the implication that students work from 
less to more powerful ideas (LEE;SHEMILT, 2003).  However, scholars caution that these 
models are not meant to be understood as linear. 
 Historical thinking as a process and a method of knowing, is a cognitive domain 
which often proves to be quite fluid with regard to how individuals epistemically move 
from one level to another. Lee and Ashby (2000) suggest, however, that there is a model 
that can help to assess the parameters through which learners move closer to or farther 
away from deeper understandings of the past. Lee and Ashby’s and Lee and Shemilt’s 
(2003) progression models illustrate the typical advancement of individuals as they learn 
how to reason historically. This progression model can be illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. A Model of Epistemic Movement in Relation to Understanding the Past 
 
1. The pastisgiven     
2. The past is inaccessible    LESS TO 
3. The past as stories anyone would tell   MORE 
4. The past as reported in a biased way   COGNITIVE/ 
5. The past selected and organized from  EPISTEMIC 
a viewpoint     POWER 
6. The past as reconstructed 
 
 
 
Research in epistemic beliefs has shed only partial light on learner epistemic 
beliefs in history because studies often have used domain-general questionnaires (e.g., 
STRØMSØ & BRÅTEN , 2006), thus likely missing the domain-specific component 
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suggested in the literature (BUEHL and ALEXANDER, 2001; MUIS and HAERLE, 2006). 
Conversely, researchers focusing specifically on the history domain (e.g., LEE;  ASHBY, 
2000) have mainly inferred student epistemic beliefs from their performance on specific 
tasks (e.g., reading of multiple historical sources or writing of document-based 
narratives).  As a result, descriptions of students’ epistemic ideas as they emerged in their 
own voices are relatively scarce.  
This study explores epistemic beliefs in the history domain in a more direct and 
focused fashion with a purpose aimed at contributing a more in-depth description of the 
ideas entertained by learners and to identify facilitating factors and potential stumbling 
blocks (i.e., cognitive impasses) in their epistemic development in the domain.  Working 
with college undergraduate history majors in the USA, this study explores how epistemic 
beliefs in history may change at this crucial developmental point.  In order to launch the 
study, we developed a theoretical framework that drew from the aforementioned 
literature, our own prior research efforts, and a cluster of theorized assumptions. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Prior to their collegiate careers in the USA, many teachers like Danielle undergo 
extensive experiences in classrooms with traditional, consumption-oriented school 
history.  During these formative years, prospective teachers develop their own 
understandings of what it means to teach and to learn (BRITZMAN, 1991).  The 
apprenticeships of observation (LORTIE, 1975) can be central to the construction of 
epistemic beliefs about historical knowledge.  They often shape durable values “…about 
the nature of school subjects, how teachers and students should behave in the classroom 
and what constitutes ‘good’ teaching” (KENNEDY, 2005, p.14). The apprenticeships can 
continue right up to, and sometimes through, formal teacher preparation programs.  By 
this we mean, for example, the kinds of history courses taught to history majors in 
cavernous university lecture halls by a talking head narrating from a Powerpoint 
presentation.  Our assumption, bolstered by the literature, is that these types teaching 
and learning apprenticeships are common and help form and solidify the foundation from 
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which prospective history teachers come to understand what history is (CUBAN, 1991).  
They also reinforce, and are reinforced by the consumer culture, especially prevalent 
among western nations. 
If prospective history teachers do not have their school history apprenticeships 
interrupted in their collegiate history courses, then the typical structure of most 
traditional teacher preparation programs provides little time to foster meaningful 
epistemic change necessary to engage with the practices, ideas, beliefs, and judgment 
criteria that research shows improves understanding.  Thus, we reasoned, a gap exists at 
least in the USA between how prospective teachers are exposed to history prior to 
formal teacher preparation and an understanding of the nature of how history works 
epistemically from knower to what it means to know.  Consequently, we asked: Where 
are prospective history teachers supposed to gain this knowledge and epistemic 
understanding and in what learning context should it occur?  
Experience with teachers like Danielle coupled with the literature on epistemic 
beliefs in history theoretically served as the basis for our design of a course prospective 
history teachers could take prior to their entrance into a formal teacher-preparation 
program.  The course was developed with three goals in mind rooted in the forgoing 
theorizations: (a) to help the enrollees examine the sorts of epistemic beliefs they held, 
(b) to assist them in understanding more about the ways in which some of those beliefs 
created impasses in their knowing of the past, and (c) to offer them some new ways of 
thinking about historical knowledge and historical-claims justifications that might help 
them overcome those impasses. Such a course, we hoped, would provide opportunities 
for prospective history teachers to bring to the surface their existing epistemic stances 
through inquiry and reflection. Wrestling with these complex ideas and engaging in 
epistemically challenging activities, we further theorized, would afford students the 
opportunity to understand the cognitive limits of their beliefs.  We hoped that, in the 
course, they would find meaning and utility in more powerful epistemic beliefs associated 
with the sort of historical thinking and judgment capabilities that cultivate deeper 
understandings of the past.  Doing so, we imagined, might enable them then to 
strengthen their pedagogical capacities once they found themselves in positions akin to 
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Danielle’s. 
Method 
An “Introduction to History Teaching” 
 In an effort to address the epistemic issues history teachers we observed 
appeared to be experiencing, the first author sketched the curriculum for the course. 
With the cooperation of the university’s history department, he offered the course to 
history majors twice in two consecutive semesters at a large public university in the USA.  
The course met once a week (14 sessions) for 75 minutes.  Students enrolled in it 
voluntarily and earned one credit if they finished the course satisfactorily.  This involved 
completing several rounds of questionnaires and other assignments including the 
construction of two lesson plan drafts, reading assigned texts, and actively participating 
in class discussions that hinged on making sense of cognitive impasses and on ways of 
skirting them. 
 In brief the course began by raising epistemic questions such as: What is history, 
what is the difference between history and the past, where do histories come from, 
what’s the difference between a fact and an opinion, and what constitutes an acceptable 
evidence-based historical interpretation or argument?  The questions were discussed 
both directly and through exercises that involved reading conflicting accounts regarding 
historical events (e.g., What happened at the Battle of Little Big Horn?) or about 
individuals (e.g., Who was Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, or…?).  The syllabus 
for each course was the same except that the historical period examples were changed 
to reflect a focus on pre-1865 American history in the first version of the course and post-
1865 in the second version.   
The course involved using a set of teaching-learning strategies that were designed 
to surface enrollees’ epistemic beliefs and open them up for consideration and 
discussion.  The course then assisted them in identifying beliefs that created cognitive 
impasses of the sort Danielle experiences.  Finally, the course provided concrete ideas 
and strategies for developing Kloppenberg’s (1989) pragmatic hermeneutics on the 
assumption that doing so would help students get beyond those impasses, and 
eventually enable them to do the same with their future students. 
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Participants 
The group comprised 18 students.  The first cluster of 11 students took the first 
course iteration and the second cluster of seven students took the second.  In each 
course, students comprised a range of freshmen (n=3 of 18), sophomores (n=6), juniors 
(n=7), and seniors (n=2).  All but three were self-declared history majors and three of the 
18 were history/education double majors.  Four students—Genevieve, Lily, Josie, and 
Michaela—two from each class agreed to be interviewed in depth about their epistemic 
beliefs with regard to a Likert-scale instrument that assessed those beliefs and the nature 
of the course experience with respect to those beliefs. 
 
Primary Measure 
We used the Beliefs about History Questionnaire (BHQ) to specifically explore and 
collect data on students’ epistemic beliefs in history. This 22-item, 6-point Likert scale 
questionnaire (see the Appendix) is a refinement of a measure whose factor structure 
was investigated, tested, and validated in previous studies (MAGGIONI ET AL. 2004; 
MAGGIONI ET AL. 2009).  Its statements were designed to reflect different 
conceptualizations of the nature of historical knowledge and exemplify beliefs 
characterizing three epistemic positions theoretically deduced from the literature on 
epistemic cognition (e.g., KING and KITCHENER, 2002; KUHN and WEINSTOCK, 2002) and 
historical thinking (e.g., LEE and SHEMILT, 2003; VANSLEDRIGHT, 2011; WINEBURG, 2001).  
In particular, some of the statements reflect beliefs in an authorless view of 
history, simplistically conceived as “what it was” (e.g., “The facts speak for 
themselves.”).  Consistent agreement on such items, we theorized, reflect what we might 
call a form of naïve realism or what we began calling objectivism, wherein history is 
understood as merely a copy of the past.  This position would be related to a naïve 
version of Kloppenberg’s (1989) idea of “scientific objectivity” in history. 
Other statements signal that history can become fundamentally subjective 
because the past becomes visible to us mainly (only?) through the voices of witnesses 
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and historians (e.g., “The past is what the historian makes it to be”).  Consistent 
agreement with such statements, again by our literature-based theorizing, suggests a 
stance of naïve subjectivism, at least in how items are worded on the BHQ.  In an extreme 
form, it would be in some ways similar to what Kloppenberg (1989) calls “complete 
relativism.” 
Finally, a third group of statements reflect awareness that history results from a 
process of inquiry: History emerges from the interaction between the historian (the 
knower) and her questions and the archive, or what’s to be known (e.g., “Reasonable 
accounts can be constructed even in the presence of conflicting evidence.”). This position 
involves knowing something about criteria for disciplining the inquiry process and 
producing defensible histories. Based yet again on our theorizing, we might refer to a 
person who would consistently agree with such statements as an adherent of criterialism 
(Kloppenberg’s pragmatic hermeneuticist).  We describe how we arrived at and then 
defined each of these epistemic positions on the BHQ in more detail in the following. 
 
Procedures 
Participants responded to the statements of the BHQ twice, once at the very 
beginning and once at the end of the semester.  They responded to the BHQ primarily in 
writing.  The first BHQ administration took place on the first day of the course and the 
second occurred on the final day for each semester’s version.  After students completed 
the BHQ the second time, they were given the initial version and asked to analyze 
changes in their responses. For each item on which their position had shifted (to greater 
or lesser agreement/disagreement), they were asked to identify the statement by 
number and explain in writing why their position had shifted.  The four key informants—
Genevieve, Lily, Josie, and Michaela—who were interviewed (by the second author), 
were asked in greater depth to discuss such changes, adding to or further explaining 
what they had written.  We identified these four near the beginning of each course 
iteration based on inter-related contrasts in the backgrounds (declared major, 
race/ethnicity to the extent possible, collegiate level) and on their initial responses to the 
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BHQ.  The second author, who sat in on classes but did not directly participate other than 
to record fieldnotes of course activities, interviewed them several times throughout each 
semester in which they were enrolled. 
 
Data Analysis 
BHQ Data.  We initially relied on a set of prior studies to theorize a set of codes we 
could use to begin analyzing and understanding the BHQ data.  The three we began with 
were copier, borrower, and criterialist positions after (MAGGIONI ET AL., 2004; 2009, 
MAGGIONI ET AL., 2009).  An iterative process of analysis ensued in which we discussed 
new categories to represent aspects emerging from the data that were not previously 
described by literature-based descriptors and checking the revised rubrics against the 
data, until most of the data could be coded according to the rubrics and no new aspects 
emerged. Thus, we used both deduction from principles and induction from the data in 
the development of the three refined categories, objectivism, subjectivism, and 
criterialism.  
In order to provide some validation for the three categories, we noted that they 
were compatible overall with Kuhn and Weinstock’s (2002) and King and Kitchener’s 
(2002) models of epistemic development, wedding them with the developmental 
trajectory of the concepts of the past, evidence, and historical accounts described in the 
work of Lee and his colleagues (LEE, 2004; LEE and ASHBY, 2000; LEE and SHEMILT, 
2003). In particular, following Kuhn and Weinstock, we found it useful to characterize 
different epistemic beliefs along a continuum representing different combinations of the 
subjective and objective dimensions of knowing. The descriptions that follow are ordered 
with reference to this characterization.  Our colleague, Liliana Maggioni, then did some 
independent, additional inter-rater analytic work with another colleague of hers to 
further validate the three categories and the continuum on which they fell (see 
MAGGIONI; VANSLEDRIGHT; REDDY, 2009). 
At one end of the objective-subjective continuum, the first category, objectivism 
describes a naïve view of knowing in which there is no overall awareness of the role of 
the knower.  Lee and Shemilt (2003) have described a similar stance: Remnants of the 
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past are conceived as brute facts granting immediate access to the past; the role of 
argument in deciding what remnants count as evidence is not acknowledged and 
eventual impasses (e.g., unresolvable conflict among differing accounts) are blamed on 
the incorrectness of the “information.” At best on this view, investigators are entrusted 
with the task of discriminating between true and false artifacts or witnesses, and 
faithfully reporting the unadulterated story told by these objective remnants, as in the 
von Rankean notion of letting the past speak in its own words. 
On the epistemic flip side of objectivism lies subjectivism. In the subjectivist’s case, 
the role of the knower is perceived, often naïvely among novices, as predominant and for 
the most part, unbounded or unrestrained by any reference to something existing 
outside of the knower; thus, the role of evidence in the construction of arguments is not 
typically acknowledged or sometimes is understood as opinion. This idea is echoed in 
Lee’s work (2004), in which he reported that some students explained differences in 
accounts as an “author problem,” due to mistakes or differences in points of view and 
the “problem of bias.”  In the present study, statements reflecting these beliefs 
underscored issues of personal opinions and/or bias, and rarely mentioned the difficulty 
in discriminating among different testimonies.  Relativistic beliefs (see KLOPPENBERG, 
1989), we had hunched, were at the root of this stance. 
Two additional categories emerged from our inductive-deductive analysis.  The 
first describes the often epistemically bumpy and cognitively inconsistent attempts to 
integrate the role of the object (the past) and of the subject (the knower) in the 
generation of knowledge and understanding—a type of epistemic wobbling.  In our 
rubric, we named these two stances as transitional (TR1 and TR2), because students 
seemed to oscillate between the arguments and ideas characterizing the two extremes 
(objectivist and subjectivist stances), frequently in their written explanations of changes 
in epistemic stances on the second BHQ administration.  These students remained unable 
to produce a coordinated knower-known synthesis and get past the cognitive impasses 
that such stances often created. 
Utterances expressing the epistemic stance named as TR1, voiced the ardent wish 
for history to simply coincide with the past. In other words, historical investigators were 
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viewed as “wannabe” chroniclers, thus sharing much with the objectivist stance.  
However, these expressions simultaneously conveyed the awareness that solid 
knowledge of the past is always, or at least very often, impossible because the 
interpretation of what we have left from the past is debatable or because we are simply 
left with too little.  In these cases and with some lament, respondents would slide then 
into describing history as a hopelessly subjective endeavor and it became just a matter of 
people’s opinions, echoing several of the ideas characterizing a subjectivist stance.  
However, contrary to a more consistent subjectivist stance, these utterances conveyed 
participants’ regret over these occurrences, expressed the belief that this should not 
necessarily be a universal condition for historical knowledge, and struck a sharp 
dichotomy between facts and opinions in an effort to override their sense of dismay and 
avoid the impasses adherence to relativistic beliefs created.  Students reflecting TR1 
positions appeared to be jaded objectivists, disheartened by the fact that, in history 
anyway, things were such that too much error and bias crept in to make definitive, 
objective knowledge possible.  And that was to everyone’s loss.  Perhaps, they seemed to 
think, we just needed to try harder to get to the bottom of the matter, without knowing 
how. 
By contrast, TR2 signals clearer movement toward coordination between object of 
knowledge and subject of knowledge generation, and is expressed by statements that 
acknowledge that history is the interpretive work of the knower based on the evidence 
(something TR1 wobblers do not acknowledge). However, these statements also indicate 
a fairly profound lack of clarity about methods, criteria, or judgment that would allow 
such coordination.  In other words, although such respondents appeared to understand 
the need for criterialism (a pragmatic hermeneutics), they simply were not sure where to 
get it or how to go about it.  Effectively, they remained stuck. 
The final developmental step on the continuum envisioned in Kuhn and 
Weinstock’s (2002) and King and Kitchener’s (2002) models, and also implicated by Lee 
(2004) involves the coordination of the objective and subjective aspects of knowing, a 
stance represented by what we call and coded as criterialism.  Individuals sharing this 
stance would recognize the interpretive role of the knower in choosing and evaluating 
the past’s residua.  In Lee’s terms (2004), these individuals would acknowledge that 
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differences among accounts depend on the very nature of historical accounts.  However, 
they would also acknowledge that such interpretive work relies on specific criteria and 
heuristics that characterize a historical method.  For example, this method allows the 
investigator to transform the remnants of the past into evidence, by asking of historical 
accounts questions that they were not necessarily designed to answer and by placing 
them in their historical context.  To warrant historical claims then requires careful 
examination of available accounts vis-à-vis questions an investigator is asking, a 
systematic evidence corroboration process that results in evidence preponderance—a 
key criterion in making knowledge claims, an effort to support claims by making such 
evidence transparent via citation, and subsequent checking by peer review.  
The criterialist also understands that, when evidence is thin or non-existent, a 
degree of subjectivist imagination is required in order to piece together historical claims.  
Therefore, a more objectivist reliance on evidence can be integrated with subjectivist 
elements in a reasonably successful coordination of beliefs, animated by strong ideas 
about how to conduct such an integration in ways that are acceptable to others who 
share the same general epistemic beliefs.  Such coordination solves for cognitive 
impasses that plague the (naïve) objectivist, who does not know how to reconcile 
conflicting accounts, and the (naïve) subjectivist, who possesses no criteria for 
determining defensible historical accounting from that which is less so.  As a result, the 
criterialist position allows for history to become doable again (see LEE, 2004). 
In analyzing the students’ epistemic beliefs, we had to rely heavily on their 
responses to items on the BHQ and their written explanations about their changing ideas.  
Due to resource limitations, we were able to interview only the four noted more 
extensively about their BHQ response changes.  As a result, we developed a method of 
weighting the responses for the 6-item Likert scale on the BHQ.  The idea was to gauge 
the magnitude of change pre-course to post-course, as a means of seeing movement 
among the students that the course design experiment was attempting to provoke.  This 
in turn, we theorized, might shed light on how better to code the students’ post-course 
stances on the categorical continuum and help us better understand the written 
comments registered and the explanations of the four interviewees.  This approach was 
underpinned by a theoretical position that stipulated that consistency of response across 
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items in a particular category (objectivism, subjectivism, criterialism) would signal a 
reasonably secure adherence to that belief stance.  Regular variations in responses, on 
the other hand, would more aptly signal a transitional stance.  In scoring the responses, 
there were three issues we needed to resolve. The first dealt with weighting.   
The BHQ’s Likert scale contains 6 levels of agreement/disagreement: strongly 
agree (6), agree (5) somewhat agree (4), somewhat disagree (3), disagree (2), and 
strongly disagree (1).  To weight this range, we scored the 18 students’ responses using 
the following equivalencies: 6 = +3; 5 = +2; 4 = +1; 3 = –1; 2 = –2; and 1 = –3 (Range:  Strongly 
agree = +3 to Strongly disagree = –3). 
The second concerned the types of items.  We identified two subscales on the 
BHQ to help differentiate understanding of results (following BUEHL & ALEXANDER, 
2001) .  Doing so required us to label items by virtue of which type of the three stances 
they were theoretically intended to sample by subscale.  The two subscales were 
identified as (a) items designed to sample epistemic beliefsabout history as a discipline or 
topic.  We labeled it as History, or H; it comprised 13 items.  The other subscale sampled 
beliefs about history teaching and learning.  We abbreviated it to HTL; it was comprised of 
9 items.  Each student’s responses on the two subscales were assessed separately using 
the +3 to –3 scoring range.   
On the H subscale there are 5 items that measure the criterialism category 
responses, 3 on objectivism responses, and 5 on subjectivism responses.  On the HTL 
subscale, there are 4 items that measure criterialism responses, 2 on objectivism 
responses, and 3 on subjectivism responses.  To illustrate scoring for subscales and 
categories within them, imagine that Student A circled 4, 6, 2, 5, and 5 Likert responses on 
the five criterialism items that assess that stance on the H subscale.  Weighting translates 
this to +1, +3, -2, +2, and +2 respectively, for an additive total of +6.  Because there are 5 
items in this subscale category, we divided +6 by 5 to arrive at a score of +1.2 (out of a 
maximum agreement/disagreement score of +3/-3).  In interpreting such a score, we 
would characterize it as “weak agreement” with the criterialism category because of its 
close proximity to 4 (somewhat agree, or +1 in weighting) on the Likert scale.  We 
engaged these steps with each subscale and category within them to arrive at scores in 
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categories across the two subscales.  
The third issue involved developing a consistency score.  To assess a sense of 
overall consistency, we were most interested in the degree to which responses aligned 
with the criterialism stance, since it was the intended target of the university course.  We 
created a ratio (expressed in percentage) of objectivist and subjectivist responses to 
criterialist ones.  For example, if a student was in agreement (+1, +2, or +3) with all 
criterialist items and in disagreement (-1, -2, or –3) on all objectivist and subjectivist items, 
they would have a 100% consistency score.  Because we were checking here for degree of 
consistency with criterialist beliefs, the quickest method to calculate a consistency score 
was to read students’ likert responses and identify how many of those responses 
expressed disagreement with criterialist items and agreement with objectivist and 
subjectivist items on the BHQ.  By totaling them as “disagreements with criterialism,” 
substracting them from the total number of items (22), and then dividing by 22, we 
arrived at the final consistency score (e.g., 22 total items minus 5 inconsistent responses = 
17/22 or 77%). 
In order to code the full outcome of students’ responses by belief category, we 
employed two theories based on iterative analyses of these data.  First, regards change 
over time.  If, given its intended criterialist-developing goals, the course was successful 
for a given student, criterialist scores would increase while objectivist and subjectivist 
scores would decrease.  The second theory here was that to be a criterialist, one would 
need to score above an averaged +2.5 (approaching strongly agree) on the criterialist 
items (both H and HTL subscales) and score negatively (i.e., in disagreement) above at 
least an averaged –2.0 (disagree) on all objectivist and subjectivist items.   
This is a high epistemic bar, but in our analyses, we had theorized a high bar all 
along in response to expert historians’ comments on the validity of the scale (MAGGIONI 
et al., 2009), possible strong social desirability effects for criterialist items and, relatedly, 
past studies (e.g., KING & KITCHENER, 2002) in which participants selected stronger, 
more positive responses on the criterialist-type items than their subsequent oral-
response rationales could justify.  To aid with this process of keeping the categorizing bar 
high, a consistency score was also calculated on the basis of responses to all 22 items.  We 
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maintain that consistency is a key feature in being able to assess stances.  We used a 
consistency score at or above 90% as a gauge of the consistency with criteralism beliefs 
on the BHQ necessary to signal a reasonably solid and stable criterialist stance. 
 Interviews.  To augment this process, we analyzed the interview data from the four 
students and written comments from the 18.  Rather than code and categorize these 
qualitative data, we used them to help substantiate the BHQ coding process just 
described.  If, for example, the qualitative data suggested that our BHQ analyses were 
inaccurate because a particular student provided a rationale or warrant that 
countermanded it, we adjusted our categorization to fit the uttered or written rationale 
or warrant.  However, those adjustments were rare.  The qualitative data consistently 
supported the BHQ codings, likely due to the stringent bars we set for levying rubric 
categorizations. 
 
Results and Interpretations 
 We begin by presenting results from our analyses of the BHQ data, specifically 
how students scored on the Likert-scale items pre-course and post-course, and how we 
categorized responses by the five categories we described.  We do this by subscale.  We 
also display consistency scores for each student.  We follow this with a description of the 
results emerging from our interview data with the four students, two from the first 
course (Genevieve, Lily) and two from the second (Josie, Michaela). 
 
Students’ Epistemic Positioning 
 Before laying out the results, it might be useful to have more context and 
background on the 18 students.  Figure 2 provides a summary of several aspects of this 
background. Fifteen of the 18 had declared history as their major field.  Typically, in their 
sophomore or junior year at this university, history majors take an initial research 
methods course in which they learn how to conduct historical research, what tools are 
required, by what general disciplinary criteria they are applied, and how to construct a 
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short historical account (thesis/argument, evidentiary claims, citations) based on a 
question and some investigations into that question.  Twelve of the 18 had taken this 
course or were taking it concurrently.  Being sophomores and juniors, 13 (72%) were in the 
middle of their collegiate experience.  Two students—Lily and Hannah—were declared 
education majors with strong interests in history.  Xavier, a geography major, was the 
only student who came to the course from outside history and/or education.  All of the 
students were of European-American descent except Genevieve, who was Asian 
American, Lily, who was African American, and Adam, who was Pakistani American.  
Students choose their own pseudonyms. 
 
Figure 2.  Background Data on the 18 College Students 
 
Class 1 (n = 11)  Class 2 (n = 7) 
Name* Major Level Research 
Methods 
Name* Major Level Research 
Methods 
Genevieve** History Senior Yes Josie*  History   Junior Yes 
Lily**        Educ Fresh No Michaela* History  Junior Yes 
Brittney Hist/Educ Soph Yes Adam       History Soph  Yes 
Lolly Hist/Educ Junior Yes Lyla         Hist/Educ Junior Yes 
Xavier      Geography Senior No Katie         History Fresh No 
Rizza History Soph No Nesa History Soph No 
Alan           Govt/Hist Junior Yes Jaya        History  Soph Yes 
Hannah      Educ Fresh No     
Bob  History Junior Yes     
Jacoby History Junior Yes     
Derick      History  Soph Yes     
Totals = 2 Seniors, 7 Juniors, 6 Sophomores, 3 Freshmen 
* All names are pseudonyms 
**Cases researched in more depth. 
    
Table 1 portrays the results of analyses of the students’ responses to the two 
administrations of the BHQ items by category and subscale, indicates comparative 
consistency scores, and shows the codings of the students’ epistemic stances relative to 
the high bar we had set.  BHQ items that sampled stances in a particular category are 
shown in parentheses at the top of each column under the category abbreviation.  The 
number following each student’s name represents either the pre-course BHQ 
administration (1) results or the post-course results (2). 
Overall, more than 75% of the students began in an epistemic transitional phase 
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and remained in one despite their course experiences.  Based on analyzing weighted 
score changes, a few students (e.g., Rizza, Bob, Josie, Lyla) appeared to sort out some 
epistemic issues in the direction of becoming more criterialist in their  
 
Table 1.  Weighted Scores for Epistemic Categories, Consistency Scores, and Codings by Student and 
Class 
 History Items History T&L Items  
Student 
Class 1 
  
Consis
-tency 
Score 
Criter-
ialism 
(3,11,13, 
18,21) 
Objec-
tivism 
(5,16,19) 
Subject-
ivism 
(2,8,12, 
14) 
Coding Criteria
lism 
(1,7,15, 
17) 
Object-
ivism 
(9,20) 
Subject-
ivism 
(4,6,10) 
Coding 
Genev. 1 +2.7 -2.7 +1 TR2 +2.75 +1 -.5 TR1 77% 
Genev. 2 +2.0 -1.0 +1.2 TR2 +3.0 0 +.67 TR2 64% 
          
Lily 1 +2.2 -1.3 -1.4 TR2 +1.5 -2.0 -1.0 TR2 86% 
Lily 2 +1.8 -1.0 -.2 TR2 +1.8 -2.5 -.67 TR2* 82% 
          
Brittn. 1 +1.6 0 +.4 TR1 +1.75 +1.0 -1.67 TR1 65% 
Brittn. 2 +2.4 -.67 +1.0 TR2 +3.0 -2.5 +1.0 TR2 80% 
          
Lolly 1 +1.0 -.33 -.60 TR2 +1.75 +1.0 0 TR1 71% 
Lolly 2 +1.4 -.67 -.20 TR2 +2.5 0 -1.0 TR2 77% 
          
Xavier 1 +1.0 0 +2.0 Subj. +1.25 0 -1.0 TR1 55% 
Xavier 2 +2.6 +1.33 -.20 TR1 +2.75 +1.0 -.33 TR1 64% 
          
Rizza 1 +.80 -.67 +.40 TR1 +1.0 -2.5 +1.33 Subj. 60% 
Rizza 2 +1.0 -2.67 -.80 TR2 +2.5 -2.5 +.67 TR2 90% 
          
Alan 1 +2.2 -1.67 -1.2 TR2 +1.0 -2.0 -1.67 TR2 86% 
Alan 2 +2.2 -2.33 0 TR2 +2.5 -3.0 -2.0 TR2* 86% 
          
Hanna.1 +2.0 +1.33 +.80 TR1 +2.0 +2.0 +1.33 TR1 50% 
Hanna.2 +1.8 -.33 +1.2 TR2 +2.75 +1.0 +1.0 TR1 59% 
          
Bob 1 +1.6 -2.33 -2.0 TR2 +1.0 -2.5 -2.0 TR2 95% 
Bob 2 +1.6 -2.67 -2.2 WeakCr
iter-
ialist? 
+1.0 -2.5 -2.67 WeakCr
iter-
ialist? 
95% 
          
Jacoby1 +1.4 -.33 -2.2 TR2 +.75 -.5 -2.0 TR2 86% 
Jacoby2 +1.6 -1.0 -2.2 TR2 +1.75 -3.0 -1.67 TR2 77% 
          
Derick 1 +1.4 -.75 -2.0 TR2 +1.25 -2.5 -2.0 TR2 86% 
Derick 2 +2.2 -2.0 -1.8 TR2 +1.5 -1.5 -1.33 TR2 86% 
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Class2 
  
Consis
-tency 
Score 
Criter-
ialism 
(3,11,13, 
18,21) 
Objec-
tivism 
(5,16,19) 
Subject-
ivism 
(2,8,12, 
14) 
Coding Criteria
lism 
(1,7,15, 
17) 
Object-
ivism 
(9,20) 
Subject-
ivism 
(4,6,10) 
Coding 
Josie 1 +2.0 -1.33 -2.2 WeakCr
iter-
ialist? 
+2.5 -2.0 -1.0 WeakCr
iter-
ialist? 
91% 
Josie 2 +3.0 -2.0 -1.2 Modera
teCriter
-ialist 
+2.75 -3.0 -.67 Modera
teCriter
-ialist 
86% 
          
Micha. 1 +1.6 -1.33 -1.0 TR2 +2.0 -2.0 -.67 TR2 86% 
Micha. 2 +1.4 -1.33 -.80 TR2 +2.0 -2.0 -.67 TR2 82% 
          
Adam 1 +1.4 +.33 +.20 TR1 +2.5 +2.0 +2.33 TR1 55% 
Adam 2 +2.0 0 -.20 TR2 +2.5 -2.5 -1.0 TR2 73% 
          
Lyla 1 +1.6 -2.0 -.80 TR2 +1.25 -2.0 -.33 TR2 73% 
Lyla 2 +2.6 -2.33 -2.2 Criter-
ialist 
+1.5 -2.5 -1.33 WeakCr
iter-
ialist 
86% 
          
Katie 1 +1.2 -.33 -.4 TR2 +.75 -1.5 -.33 TR2 68% 
Katie 2 +2.0 +1.0 -.2 TR1 +1.75 -2.0 +.33 TR2 68% 
          
Nesa 1 +2.0 +.33 -1.0 TR1 +1.75 0 -.33 TR1 73% 
Nesa 2 +1.6 -.33 -.20 TR2 +2.0 -1.0 -.67 TR2 73% 
          
Jaya 1 +1.8 -.67 -1.2 TR2 +1.75 -2.0 -1.33 TR2 91% 
Jaya 2 +1.6 0 -1.2 TR2 +1.0 -2.0 -.67 TR2 77% 
 
TR1 or TR2 represents one of the transitional categories.  We took to calling these students wobblers. 
TR2* = Possibly a very weak criterialist.  EBCr? = Likely a weak criterialist, yet the scores are not fully 
beyond the high bars set despite approaching them closely. 
 
 
leanings, while others remained more perplexed about their epistemic positionings. 
However, another way of representing the data reveal a pattern that show the 
course did help move students generally toward adjusting their stances away from 
positions that created impasses for them and towards stronger criterialist orientations.  If 
a goal of the course was—in BHQ terms—to increase positive scores on criterialist items 
and increase negative scores on objectivist and subjectivist items as proxies for epistemic 
belief shifts, then we can display scores in this way by looking across Table 1 for such 
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examples and counting the difference between pre-course to post-course in each 
category.  Furthermore, we can invert this method by comparing how many reductions 
there were in ambivalent (i.e., average at zero) and positive responses to objectivist and 
subjectivist items from pre- to post-course BHQ administrations as well as how many 
negative scores appeared on criterialist items from pre to post.  Table 2 shows these two 
different frequency relationships. 
 
Table 2.  Increases and Decreases in Scores on the Three Categories from Pre- to Post-Course BHQ 
Administrations (both subscales) 
 
 Pre-Course BHQ 
Number of 
student cases 
Post-Course BHQ 
Number of student 
cases 
Total Change DirectionofEpistemi
cChange 
High-bar (≥+2.5) 
Criter. Scores 
1 6 +5 Increasetowardcour
segoal 
High-bar (>–2.0) 
Object. Scores 
3 9 +6 Increasetowardcour
segoal 
High-bar (>–2.0) 
Subject. Scores 
2 3 +1 Increasetowardcour
segoal 
Totals 6 18 +11  
Pluses or Zeroes 
Object. Scores 
6 7 +1 Increase away from 
course goal 
Pluses or Zeroes 
Subject. Scores 
6 6 No Change No reduction 
toward course goal 
Minuses or 
Zeroes Criter. 
Scores 
0 0 No change  
Totals 12 13 +1  
 
 
The patterns here suggest that the course did have some influence in moving 
students away from objectivist and subjectivist beliefs that tended to created cognitive 
impasses for them as they attempted to understand history and how it might best be 
taught, but in somewhat unpredictable ways.  For example, of the six students who had 
high-bar criterialism, objectivism, and subjectivism scores on BHQ 1, three maintained or 
raised their scores by BHQ 2 while the other three had scores that dropped below the 
high bar.  It is also clear that about a third of the students remained tethered to some 
degree to either objectivist or subjectivist types of beliefs (although not both 
simultaneously except Hannah and Katie), albeit perhaps less naïve ones than when they 
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entered the course experience.  Teacher Danielle’s difficulty with the “bias problem” no 
doubt was troublesome for these students as well.  For them it seemed that history 
remained subjectively, and perhaps perversely, interpretive in a way that made them pine 
for a more objectivity to solve for the difficulty.  Yet, the course appeared to hold little 
power for helping them develop tools that could secure it.  Like Danielle, they remained 
mostly either epistemic dualists or wobbling about in a transitional phase. 
In attempting to understand the past, perspective’s influence is indeed ubiquitous 
and inescapable.  Learning tools and building criteria to manage its influence can be a 
difficult undertaking.  Even professional history investigators, who can be thought of as 
expert thinkers and tool and criteria wielders, wrestle with what to do with it and argue 
among themselves about the proper relationship between the knower and what she can 
know about the past (e.g., DAVIDSON andLYTLE, 1992; DAVIS, 1988; FINLAY, 1988; 
MEGILL, 2007; NOVICK, 1988). 
 A third approach to representing these data is to go on a case-by-case basis 
through the BHQ scores represented in Table 1 in an effort to identify how many students 
demonstrated a clear pattern of growth in criterialist scores while simultaneously 
increasing their negative scores on objectivist and subjectivist items.  The consistency 
score is a gauge of such a pattern. 
No student demonstrated 100% consistency.  However, several students 
approached it, Lolly, for example.  Only her subjectivist score on the History subscale 
moves in the opposite direction than the course experiences were designed to steer it, 
and then only very slightly.  Rizza is another example.  Her scores all move in the direction 
hoped, except that her objectivism on the HTL subscale stays the same (although a 
strong negative score as intended) and her subjectivist scores on the same subscale are 
attenuated slightly while still remaining positive.  Alan is a third such case.  The only 
discrepancy in the history pattern is that, on the H subscale, his subjectivist score moves 
from a negative position to an ambivalent one.  He seems to be saying here that he is not 
sure what to believe.  History can be both more or less subjective, but how much and 
how often he is not sure and he is not certain he has the criteria to know the difference.  
He may also be saying that he is comfortable with that ambivalence.  However, it could 
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create impasses in his thinking as he wrestles with the past’s residue. 
 Bob is perhaps the closest example of showing movement in beliefs in the 
directions intended and with consistency.  He begins with reasonably consistent 
criterialist beliefs and then his pattern indicates that his position strengthens somewhat.  
However, like Rizza, he has several scores that remain unchanged, suggesting that the 
course did not have much impact on him regarding those beliefs.  Josie’s pattern is 
virtually identical to Bob’s.  We say more about her case momentarily.  It may be that the 
course had little epistemic-change value for those entering it who already held somewhat 
consistent epistemic stances that were tied to how they experienced the course and 
understood its goal frameworks.  For example, the half of the students (n = 9) who had 
the highest initial consistency scores (ranging from 77 to 95%) saw no increases in those 
scores (See Table 3). 
 Consistency of epistemic position—common among domain experts (e.g.,  
 
Table 3.  Comparison of Score Changes for Students with Low and High Initial Consistency 
 
Low Initial Consistency (n=9)  High Initial Consistency (n=9) 
Student Level Initial/ 
Endpoint 
Differ- 
ence 
Student Level Initial/ 
Endpoint 
Differ- 
ence 
Rizza Soph 60/90 +30 Jaya* Soph 91/77 –14 
Adam* Soph 55/73 +18 Genevieve* Senior 77/64 –13 
Brittney* Soph 65/80 +15 Jacoby* Junior 86/77 –9 
Lyla* Junior 73/86 +13 Josie* Junior 91/86 –5 
Xavier** Senior 55/64 +9 Micheala* Junior 86/82 –4 
Hannah Fresh 50/59 +9 Lily Fresh 86/82 –4 
Lolly* Junior 71/77 +6 Derick* Junior 86/86 0 
Nesa Soph 73/73 0 Alan* Junior 86/86 0 
Katie Fresh 68/68 0 Bob* Junior 95/95 0 
* Those students who had completed at least one history research methods course or were 
taking one concurrently. 
** Geography major. 
 
Totals:      Totals: 
0 = Decreased consistency   6 = Decreased consistency 
2 = No change     3 = No change 
7 = Increased consistency   0 = Increased consistency 
 
 
MAGGIONI et al., 2009)—remains a highly salient feature of efforts to identify movement 
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among the students from course entry to exit.  Overall, a striking pattern of two halves 
emerged.  That is, those nine students with the lowest initial consistency saw the greatest 
increases towards more stabilized positions, while those nine with the highest initial 
consistency saw it either decrease or remain the same (Table 3).  
We would argue that the course appeared to assist the nine with lower initial 
consistency scores in clarifying aspects of their epistemic beliefs in ways that helped 
them begin to stabilize positions in the direction of criterialism without necessarily 
helping them become full-fledged criterialists.  Rizza (+30%), Adam (+18%), Brittney (+15%), 
and Lyla (+13%) are strong cases in point.  Brittney, for example, noted in writing at the 
end of her responses to changes from BHQ 1 to BHQ 2 that the course had a profound 
effect on her rethinking of and clarifying around the underpinnings of her epistemic 
beliefs about both history and history teaching and learning.  Hannah, on the other hand, 
continued to suffer from considerable epistemic confusion and instability, despite seeing 
her consistency improve by nine percentage points.  Hannah’s consistency was the 
lowest of any of the 18 students both at the beginning and at the end of the course 
(50/59).  Her written comments at the end of BHQ 2 reflected this confusion, but she did 
say that the course helped her get clearer about a few matters related to her initial over-
reliance on the belief that history was what actually happened.  Two contributing factors 
may have been her freshman status and that she was a declared education major, and 
therefore had not been exposed to history as a disciplinary domain, say, relative to junior 
history majors, Bob and Josie. 
For the more initially-consistent nine, the course either had no criterialist impact or 
apparently succeeded in destabilizing beliefs.  Many of these nine came into the course in 
transition and left in transition.  It is possible that the course may have created awareness 
around taken-for-granted or unexamined epistemic assumptions that caused re-
examination and thus reduced consistency.  Bob, whose consistency remained at 95%, is 
an exception here; he was reasonably confident in his criterialist beliefs coming into the 
course, and left with that confidence intact.  Jaya was the most notable example of the 
trend among those whose consistency decreased.  In analyzing her drop from 91% 
consistency to 77% (–14), we theorized that, based on her occasional oral in-class 
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participation and responses to course activities, she came into the course reasonably 
astute at selecting socially-desirable—but not yet fully self-analyzed—responses to BHQ 
items, accounting for her initial high consistency.  However, the course provoked her to 
question her beliefs in ways that upon seeing BHQ 2, she became more sensitized to 
those beliefs.  This in turn caused her to respond more cautiously to items and map her 
responses more closely to the transitional (TR2) beliefs she actually held.  There could be 
other ways to interpret Jaya’s case, but what we suggest here seemed most plausible to 
us. 
Two other features of this manner of displaying the data are also notable.  Of 
those nine with low initial consistency scores, six were underclassman.  Of the high half, 
only two were.  And second, in the low half, only four students had taken or were taking a 
research methods course in history.  All but one of the high-half students had taken or 
was taking such a course.  This may suggest that a combination of more years of 
collegiate experience (e.g., growth in intellectual maturity) and epistemological questions 
likely raised in a history research methods course may help to reduce the greater 
epistemic wobbling that characterizes lower classman and those who had yet to take a 
such research methods course. 
 
History (H) and History-Teaching-and-Learning (HTL) Subscale Changes 
 It could be that consistency of a student’s epistemic stance regarding history may 
not need to be coherent with their stance regarding teaching and learning the subject 
(50% of students had higher criterialist H consistency scores than criterialist HTL scores 
initially).  This might be a function of them gradually learning more about what history is 
in history courses (especially for those who took history research courses) and as history 
majors without it necessarily influencing their views of learning and teaching it drawn 
principally from their apprenticeships of observation in K-12 classrooms.  All 18 students 
had yet to take a formal education course that might have begun to challenge the 
assumptions they held about what it means to teach history. 
Overall, the pattern of change in criterialist scores on both H and HTL subscales 
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was generally up from BHQ 1 to 2.  Specifically, of the 18, 10 students’ (56%) criterialist 
weighted scores went up on H items, and 14 (78%) on HTL items.  Three scores remained 
unchanged on H items and three on HTL items.  Five scores (28%) fell on the former and 
only one (6%) on the latter.  Jaya was the only student to have criterialist weighted scores 
drop in each category from BHQ 1 to BHQ 2.  As we observed, by the time she saw BHQ 2, 
she likely had become more self-aware of her beliefs in ways that caused her to study 
items more carefully and adjust responses to achieve some alignment.  For example, her 
agreement on item 21 (history is a reasonable reconstruction of past occurrences based 
on available evidence) fell by one point (5 to 4) and she explained this by noting that she 
was put off by the term reasonable.  She noted, “…not all of history is necessarily 
reasonable or makes sense.”  This could have been a response to course stress on the 
idea that one could distinguish between historical accounts that were effectively nothing 
more than groundless opinions and accounts that were heavily supported by evidence 
and therefore more solid and acceptable as claims. 
Commitments to objectivism in History subscale dropped for 14 students (78%) and 
rose for 3 (17%), while one (Michaela) registered no change.  Objectivist HTL subscale 
scores dropped for 14 students (78%), one person’s (Xavier) score rose, and four (22%) 
remained unchanged from pre to post.  Overall, there was slightly less movement in the 
unintended direction on the HTL subscale, a likely consequence of the course’s focus on 
history teaching and learning and specifically on the problems and impasses associated 
with over-stressing the objectivist nature of history (e.g., that a right answer is always 
within reach) when teaching the subject.  Epistemic commitments to subjectivist items on 
the H subscale fell for five students (28%), but rose for 11 students (61%).  Two students 
were unchanged in their responses from pre to post.  On the HTL subscale subjectivist-
item agreement decreased for six students (33%) and increased for 11 students (61%), 
while only one student’s score (Michaela) remained unchanged.  As with Josie, we say 
more about her case momentarily. 
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Four Brief Case Examples 
 Genevieve. At the end of the course, we categorized Genevieve, an Asian-American 
history and museum studies senior in the second transition (TR2), although she remained 
in agreement with subjectivism on both the H and HTL subscales and her levels of 
agreement actually rose from BHQ 1 to BHQ 2, while her H subscale agreement scores 
dropped.  She also had moderately weak consistency scores that dropped by BHQ 2.  We 
wondered if she might be better categorized as in the first transitional state.  Yet, her 
comments and interview data showed some integration of the object and subject 
positions and beliefs about history being an interpretive enterprise heavily involving the 
investigator in interactions with accounts.   
With regard to BHQ item 11, for example, she noted that she was confused by the 
statement, “history is a critical inquiry into the past” initially, but after BHQ 2, she said, 
“…I have a better idea how history works and how critical thinking can come from a 
number of different perspectives, which does in fact make history a critical inquiry into 
the past.  It’s a matter of asking questions.”  With regard to constructing reasonable 
accounts based on evidence (BHQ #18), she observed, “It is possible that a more accurate 
account can be constructed in the presence of conflicting evidence because then there is 
an acknowledgement [by the investigator] that there is more than one side to the story” 
(her emphasis).   
Finally, with regard to facts speaking for themselves (#16), she argued, “The facts 
don’t speak for themselves because there are so many ‘facts’ in every story.  You have to 
interpret the facts” (her emphases).  All of her remarks imply or state directly the 
presence of the knower (investigator) interacting with what is attempted to be known 
(residua), suggesting ongoing epistemic effort at successfully resolving and coordinating 
that relationship, rather than resignation or lament in its face.  That she leaned toward 
growing agreement with a subjectivist stance is not necessarily surprising given her 
epistemic wobbling.  Her interview data showed that she was still trying to sort out the 
proper role, tools, and criteria investigators assume and rely on as they interpret the 
past’s residue.  Bracketing subjectivism in doing so was not something she had entirely 
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accomplished. 
 Lily.  A freshman education major and second-generation African American, Lily 
was also in epistemic transition (TR2), although her overall criterialist weighted scores 
showed less than straight agreement.  Her consistency scores were reasonably strong, 
but fell below the high bar we had set for description as a criterialist.  Like Genevieve, Lily 
seemed to be struggling to coordinate the relationship between the knower and what 
could be known about the past.  With regard to interpretations of the past being linked to 
a lack of evidence (item 5), Lily registered strong disagreement on BHQ 2.  She observed, 
“Evidence is in the eye of the beholder.  You could think something is evidence and 
someone else could think it inconsequential…that’s what I was thinking about.”  Initially 
Lily held strong agreement with the idea that history was a critical inquiry into the past.  
By BHQ 2, that agreement had attenuated.  To explain the shift, she said, “Sometimes its 
someone using history in their [sic] words to brainwash someone about an event.  You 
know, to this day, people say that [the Holocaust] did not happen.”  This issue had been 
discussed on at least two occasions in class. Her explanations show her wrestling with the 
knower’s role as she attempts to make sense of the past.  She remains uncertain, for 
example, about how to separate “brainwashing” efforts from defensible histories, yet 
knowing how evidence is used matters. 
 Lily did suggest the she held some nascent ideas about criteria and tools for 
managing this problematic epistemic space.  In responding to her shift from agreement 
to disagreement with the statement, “the past is what the historian makes it to be,” she 
argued, 
I was thinking that if you only look at…and read the book, you can only 
get what the historian wants you to get from it. But these history books 
get their information from somewhere…if you only allow your opinion to 
be based on someone else’s without researching it yourself —you know, 
you could read a book about one period in history and if you only read 
that one book, that’s the opinion you are going to have. But then if you 
go and research it and say, this person says this and this person says that, 
then you can think what do I think, and you can come up with a synthesis, 
or you can say that you don’t agree with either of them. 
 
Here she notes efforts to coordinate the role of the knower with what can be 
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known from the past’s objects and implicates a research process for aiding that 
coordination, suggesting the idea of evidence preponderance in forming Kloppenberg’s 
(1989) idea of a provisional synthesis.  However, she sheds little light on what the process 
looks like or how it might work to help her settle disputes.  The limited sense of a fully 
productive position for evaluating and arbitrating knowledge claims was common to 
these students, especially those who had yet to take a historical research methods 
course. 
 Josie.  She was a European-American junior history major who had been home 
schooled, attended a local community college for two years, and the transferred to the 
university.  Her home schooling had featured a program that was literature based, 
integrating most of all of the subjects she learned about with literature selections.  It was 
difficult to trace out the influence of that home-schooling curriculum on her ideas and 
epistemic beliefs.  However, she was remarkably consistent in her epistemic stance 
(second only to Bob) with virtually maximum weighted scores on criterialist items on the 
second BHQ.  She also bore out the criterialist pattern by displaying consistent 
disagreement with objectivist and subjectivist items.  We thought of her as perhaps 
ending as the only moderate criterialist among the 18 students.  Josie noted that she had 
benefited from the history research course she had taken in her sophomore year, 
remarking that, “I see the disciplined method of inquiry necessary to write history” (her 
emphasis). 
 One element that was added to the second version of the course students took 
involved a more concerted effort to explicitly teach specific criteria and especially 
strategic historical-analysis procedures and heuristics for dealing with evidence (e.g., the 
ideas of preponderance and contextualization) and making defensible claims based on it.  
These additions hinged on learning to identify an account’s author, attribute an account 
to its historical context, assess the perspective and subtexts it might contain, and judge 
its reliability with respect to other accounts from the period and in lieu of the questions 
the investigator was asking (cf. VANSLEDRIGHT, 2011).  Those strategies resonated 
particularly with Josie, who was able to integrate them with what she had learned in her 
history research methods course.  She noted, “Learning how to identify perspective—like 
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we talked about with PAIRe—is essential to learning how to view/do history.”  She also 
observed, “We can use [firsthand] accounts to interpret a general account as we talked 
about numerous times.”  Here she suggests the evaluative criterion of judging a history 
by the light of how it uses firsthand accounts to argue its knowledge claims, a practice 
fairly common in the discipline.  Such positioning suggests to us that, of the 18, Josie was 
epistemically farther along the developmental continuum towards a criterialist stance 
than her college counterparts, with the possible exception of Bob. 
 Michaela.  A European-American junior history major, who had attended local 
public schools and had experienced a traditional history curriculum, Michaela showed 
remarkable stasis in her BHQ scores from pre to post administrations.  On the HTL 
subscale in fact, there was no change.  She was the only student for whom this occurred.  
Her BHQ scores showed weak to moderate agreement with criterialism and generally 
weak disagreements with objectivism and subjectivism.  We interpreted her to be in the 
second level of transition because her comments suggested that she, like many of her 
colleagues, was still attempting to work out beliefs that would successfully coordinate 
the knower/known relationship.  Yet, in many ways, she also seemed like a bright but very 
traditional college student, anxious to get good grades and attain a high GPA while 
simultaneously still having considerable fun, and then graduating and qualifying for a 
well-paying job.  Most college courses were something to endure along the way.  Perhaps 
as a result, her comments regarding her few changes on BHQ items were unrevealing and 
her interview articulations shed little additional light.   
She was aware that the knower faced a challenge in understanding the past, that 
impasses were often difficult to overcome, and that the knower needed extra vigilance 
and sharp judgment in accomplishing syntheses.  However, it was unclear whether she 
had fully established for herself a set of workable criteria and strategic, analytic processes 
for overcoming cognitive impasses.  She could articulate them but often in general terms 
and without much further specification: 
You need to be able to read, and relatively quickly. You need to know 
how to understand bias, understand what else is going on in the world.  
[You] need to understand who, what when, where, why questions.  
[You] need to understand why someone is saying something and how 
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they [sic] got to the question. …[T]he knowledge to look into things 
deeper—critical thinking skills. 
 
She was unlike Josie in this regard and the contrast between these two smart college 
juniors served as an interesting case comparison of the differences between a moderate 
criterialist position and someone in transition. 
 
Conclusion 
For these college students, epistemic wobbling appeared to be common.  Working 
out a successful coordination between themselves as knowers and what can be known 
about the past through its remaining objects is a difficult feat.  But we would argue it is a 
necessary one: Being able to think historically and do history depend upon developing 
something that resembles what we are describing as criterialism (or what Kloppenberg 
calls a pragmatic hermeneutics).  Over-reliance on trusting objects from the past to 
deliver their stories in an unmediated and unproblematic way is not possible.  Nor does an 
over-reliance on knower subjectivity solve the issue of how to more deeply make sense of 
the past. 
If we accept the premise that to work out a successful coordinated epistemic 
position requires, in part, experiences that provide opportunities to practice doing history 
and engaging in difficult aspects of historical thinking, then more such experiences would 
be better than fewer.  During these experiences, it also would appear to make sense for 
learners to develop a vocabulary for describing their efforts.  This would allow them to be 
more aware of how their epistemic positionings change and enable them possess more 
control over moving forward productively.  Experiences in history departments (research 
methods courses) and in teacher preparation programs are implicated by the outcomes 
of this study. 
It is important to note the limitations of this work.  This was an exploratory study 
done with limited data-collection resources.  We were unable to conduct verbal report 
protocols on how students responded to the two administrations of the BHQ.  Therefore, 
we relied on participants’ self-reports about the nature of their epistemic changes from 
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pre to post, and those reports can be somewhat unreliable since participants often had 
difficultly articulating changes in taken-for-granted epistemic assumptions.  As a result, 
how wobbling and shifting occurred, under what circumstances, and related to which 
specific course experiences is based partially on our inferential estimates. 
Although we believe the data obtained from the BHQ instrument are valuable and 
revealing, what they tell us is less than precise.  More extensive data collection efforts 
would likely be necessary to offset a reliance on making high-inference interpretations.  
As noted, verbal reports might be necessary.  More extensive interviewing with 
additional participants would also help.  The latter could be used more effectively to 
pinpoint specific course experiences that assisted in inducing epistemic changes and 
reducing those that produced fewer impacts.  However, doing exploratory studies can 
clarify what work remains. 
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Appendix 
Beliefs about History Questionnaire List of Statements 
1. It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with evidence. 
2. History is simply a matter of interpretation. 
3. A historical account is the product of a disciplined method of inquiry. 
4. Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the historian 
makes it to be. 
5. Disagreement about the same event in the past is always due to lack of evidence. 
6. Good students know that history is basically a matter of opinion. 
7. Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence.  
8. Historical claims cannot be justified, since they are simply a matter of interpretation. 
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9. Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn history well. 
10. Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students can believe 
whatever story they choose. 
11. History is a critical inquiry about the past. 
12. The past is what the historian makes it to be. 
13. Comparing sources and understanding author perspective are essential components 
of the process of learning history.  
14. It is impossible to know anything for sure about the past, since no one of us was 
there. 
15. Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and students alike. 
16. The facts speak for themselves. 
17. Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of interpretation. 
18. Reasonable accounts can be constructed even in the presence of conflicting 
evidence. 
19. Even eyewitnesses do not always agree with each other, so there is no way to know 
what happened. 
20. Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, only check that they 
know the facts. 
21. History is the reasonable reconstruction of past occurrences based on the available 
evidence. 
22. There is no evidence in history. 
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